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Abstract
The election of Maoist leader Baburam Bhattrai as Nepal’s Prime
Minister on August 29 ,2011 marked a clear deviation from India’s recent
policy of rallying anti Maoist forces to keep Nepal’s Maoists from
returning to power. Bhattrai was elected with the support of the Terai or
plain region parties which represent Nepal’s Madhesi population. Most
Madhesi parties, since their rise into national prominence in 2007, were
known to have calibrated their moves with India. The formation of Mr.
Bhattarai’s government raises many questions. Does the return of Maoist
led government in Kathmandu signal a real shift in New Delhi’s policy
towards Nepal’s major political actors? Is the formation of MaoistMadhesi coalition a sign of India’s waning influence on the principals of
Nepali politics? Have Nepal’s traditional political parties, the Nepali
Congress (NC), and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-UML), lost
India’s confidence in their ability to achieve a breakthrough with the
Maoists in completing the peace process or to effectively encounter the
Maoist challenge? This paper examines these questions in order to
understand if recent developments in Nepal signal a fundamental
recalibration of India-Nepal relations and how India’s policies in Nepal
have helped or hindered Nepal’s peace process.
India-Nepal Relations and Nepal’s peace process
India’s support to Nepal’s current peace process, which began with a
12 point agreement signed in New Delhi in November 2005 between
Nepal’s democratic political parties and the Maoists, has been critical.
Yet, New Delhi failed to anticipate the swift and sweeping trajectory of
political avalanche that struck Kathmandu, challenging key premises of
India’s Nepal policy. In April 2006, King Gyanendra’s regime confronted
its worst street challenge with Kathmandu’s streets filled with hundreds of
thousands of protestors demanding an end to monarchy. India’s crisis
envoy to the Kingdom sought to work out a compromise between the King
and opposition with a view to save Nepal’s monarchy in keeping with its
twin pillar policy; it was too late. The King was forced to reinstate the
dissolved parliament and hand over power to Nepal’s Seven Party
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Alliance (SPA). By May 2008, Nepal’s monarchy was gone; the palace
now has become a national museum.
On November 21, 2006 the SPA government and the Maoists signed a
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) formally ending over a decade old
Maoist insurgency. The agreement was a bold initiative to bring the
Maoists into the mainstream of democratic politics. The implementation of
this peace process has been severely punctuated by differences between
the Maoists and other political parties reducing Nepal’s politics from crisis
to crisis.
New Delhi’s resolve to support this peace process was never very
strong. Confronting a growing menace of a violent Maoist insurgency at
home, many in India’s security and foreign policy establishment were
deeply cynical of the prospects for a negotiated settlement between
Nepal’s political parties and the Maoists. Instead, they favored continuing
support to the Nepali army and the King to dismantle the Maoist forces.
Nepal’s discordant and despairing political parties also had deep
suspicions of the Maoist’s intentions. Thus, for both New Delhi and
Nepal’s political party, reconciliation with King Gyanendra and a united
front against the Maoists had remained a preferred course. However, King
Gyanendra’s uncompromising stance coupled with the failure of his
security forces to control the insurgency threw a spanner in this course and
drove Nepal’s political parties to explore peace with the Maoists.
For the mandarins in New Delhi, the King’s rigid stance was
troublesome but not enough to favor power sharing with the Nepali
Maoists. Suddenly, the dynamics changed after the 2004 elections. The
BJP led coalition was replaced by a Congress Party led coalition which
depended for its support on India’s left front parties. The leaders of the left
front, especially the CPI (M), viewed the prospects for reaching peace
with Nepal’s Maoists as an opportunity to delink Nepali Maoists from
their Indian counterparts and to show a pathway also for the Indian
Maoists. It was thus the logic of India’s coalitional politics rather than a
studied shift on the part of India’s foreign policy and security experts that
reoriented India’s Nepal policy; the policy was experimental and halfhearted. The following quotation by a noted Indian commentator
highlights the nature of this dilemma:
New Delhi does not want a scenario where the Maoists are lionized. It
can visualize the effect this can have on the Naxelite (Maoist guerrillas) in
its own backyard. The problem has assumed such proportions that it is
already causing concern. According to official sources, the Naxelite have
an upper hand in large areas of India's countryside, in one fourth of 600
districts in 13 out of 28 states. The Naxalites in India and the Maoists in

145

Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2011
Nepal have also constituted a SAARC-like organization: Coordination
Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia
(COMPOSA). They want to establish a socialist South Asia through an
armed struggle.23
The progress of Nepal’s peace process has been episodic at best. The
Constituent Assembly elected in April 2008 for a two-year term has
repeatedly failed to complete its mission; it has given itself several
extensions. Nepal’s non-Maoist political parties have realized significant
cooperation to withstand the Maoist moves to force their policies,
integration of thousands of Maoist combatants into the Nepal army being
the most controversial. However, deep rivalries among the leaders of each
parties and unending tug of war between and within parties over the
selection of government leaders have rendered governance a nightmare for
these leaders, and more so for the people of Nepal.

India’s policy help or hindrance?
Opinion in Kathmandu is sharply divided over India’s role in Nepal’s
peace process. During my conversations with cross sections of Nepali
people in summer 2010, most people resented if not outright opposed the
Indian policies. Criticisms centered mainly over India’s frequent use of its
“veto” power in Nepal’s internal affairs which made the Nepali leaders too
dependent on India’s signals. A well known commentator in Kathmandu
thought that India’s interference had become so excessive that it was
bound to boomerang on New Delhi. A member of Nepal’s National
Human Rights Commission expressed dismay at India’s indifference to
the human rights situation in Nepal; he described India’s stand at odds
with that of other international organizations. The leader of a plain based
party complained that India was driven by one point agenda of keeping the
Maoists, the largest party in parliament, from returning to power and was
using all its economic and political muscle to this end. The Maoist leader,
P. K. Dahal, frustrated with India’s objection over the Maoist’s stance on
Katuwal controversy, declared that he did not see much point in talking to
Nepali leaders over civilian supremacy as they toed Indian line and would
rather talk to India on the issue.
While one could argue over the calculus of gains and losses for India’s
objectives in Nepal, New Delhi’s role in the management of Nepal’s crisis
ridden political milieu has steadily been rising. Four factors have driven
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the dynamics of internal as well as external forces in Nepal’s slow
transition: constant wrangling among Nepal’s political parties over
compliance with the CPA; the rise of the Madhesi parties as an important
factor on the national scene; the surprisingly impressive performance of
the Nepali Maoists in the 2008 CA elections debunking Indian observer
Ashok Mehta’s assertion that the Maoists would not rise to power in
Kathmandu 24; and the emergence of a new ruling coalition in New Delhi
following 2009 elections. India’s aversion to the Maoists reached a new
height after 2009 elections which ended the UPA’s dependence on the left
front that had supported the mainstreaming of Nepali Maoists.
Nepal’s what I would call a hyper-pluralized political landscape has too
many players with veto powers which has made its political actors less
cooperative and more confrontational. The biggest rupture between the
Maoists and Nepal’s other political parties occurred in 2009 over the
extension of Army Chief of Staff Rukumgat Katuwal’s term. The Maoist
Prime Minister ignoring his coalition partners refused to extend his term
and appointed his replacement. In what the Maoist described as a “coup,”
Nepal’s President, with explicit support from India, immediately restored
Mr. Katuwal to his position resulting in Prime Minister’s resignation in
May. The Maoist’s ouster from power saw a series of short term
governments resulting from power sharing arrangements between Nepali
political parties. India saw the Maoists intransigence over Katuwal issue
as too uncompromising a stand to facilitate the peace process. Hence,
preventing the Maoists’ return to power became the principal objective of
India’s policy.
For those supporting Nepal’s democratic peace process, India’s support
to democratic forces remains a bulwark shielding Nepal’s transition from
being overrun by the Maoists. Without the Indian backing, Nepal’s weak
political parties lacked confidence to keep the Maoists from attempting a
violent takeover. India’s maneuverings to block the Maoists return to
power also strengthened those more committed to the peace process in the
Maoist camp. The formation of Bhattarai’s government has followed deep
debate and dissension within the ranks of Nepali Maoists which now have
effectively divided the parties in three wings; the factions led by
Prachanda and Bhattarai have spearheaded the formation of the latest
coalition and reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process and a
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more accommodative stance towards India. Following a breakthrough on
the number of Maoist combatants to be incorporated into the Nepal Army,
the new government has entered into a Seven Point deal with other
political parties to expedite the peace process. With greater commitment
on the part of Maoists to the peace process, Nepal’s fledgling transition
has raised new hopes for revival.
India’s blatant intervention and dictates has its downsides. As India
plays its switch and bait tactic with ever growing number of Nepal’s
political stakeholders, the risks of failure, as seen above, become greater.
For example, in the midst of maneuverings leading to the formation of the
Bhattarai led coalition, many Madhesi leaders had pleaded with India that
entering into a coalition with the Maoists offered them the best chance to
advance their demands for regional autonomy as Nepal’s other
mainstream parties were much more hostile to those demands. Moreover,
India’s indifference or ambivalence to the Madhesi demands has also
alienated the Madhesi leaders, who had to repeatedly resort to disruptive
streets protests to get their way. Interestingly, all of Nepal’s major
political parties, including the Maoists, have blamed India for mobilization
and protests in the plain region.
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